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Comment on “Groove is in the Hart”: 
A Workable Solution for Applying the 
Right of Publicity to Video Games 
Christopher B. Seaman* 
The right of publicity is increasingly important to the 
multibillion-dollar video game industry.1 In particular, many 
sports-related video games, including Electronics Arts’ popular 
NCAA® Football and NCAA® Basketball franchises, incorporate 
the likenesses and personas of professional and amateur athletes 
as an integral part of gameplay.  
Not surprisingly, some athletes depicted in these games have 
demanded compensation for the commercial exploitation of their 
likenesses and personas.2 However, their claims are in tension 
with the First Amendment,3 which safeguards freedom of speech 
and expression, including expressions that implicate the right of 
publicity.4 Federal and state courts have split regarding how to 
                                                                                                     
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law. I thank Mr. Rice and the Editorial Board of the Washington and Lee Law 
Review for inviting me to participate in the 2014 Washington and Lee Law 
Review Notes Colloquium and for the efforts of the Law Review’s Editorial 
Board and Staffwriters in preparing my Comment for publication. 
 1. See ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASS’N, 2014 ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE 
COMPUTER AND VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY 13 (2014), http://www.theesa.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/ESA_EF_2014.pdf (stating that over $15 billion was 
spent on video game content in the United States in 2013).  
 2. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 
F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a video game developer’s use of 
athlete’s likeness in video games was not entitled to a First Amendment defense 
as a matter of law); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146–47, 170 (3d Cir. 
2013) (holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in 
defendants’ favor in a lawsuit instituted on behalf of college athletes who 
alleged violations of their right of publicity by appropriation of their likeness in 
college football video games).  
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 4. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First 
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 67 (1994) 
(discussing the “inherent conflict between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment”); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the 
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resolve this tension, adopting a variety of judicially created tests 
that legal scholars have criticized as creating “massive 
confusion”5 and uncertainty about the scope of First Amendment 
protection.6 
In his Note “Groove is in the Hart”: A Workable Solution for 
Applying the Right of Publicity to Video Games,7 Garrett Rice 
seeks to address this important issue by proposing a new 
approach, which he labels the “readily identifiable” standard.8 I 
believe that Mr. Rice’s well-researched and clearly written Note 
makes a valuable contribution in the ongoing debate on how to 
balance appropriately these competing interests in the video 
game context. I am grateful to have the opportunity to participate 
in a scholarly dialogue regarding his Note. 
The recognition of a property right in one’s name, likeness, 
and persona is a relatively recent development in American law.9 
The right of publicity grew out of the common law right to 
privacy,10 but it was only first recognized as an independent 
cause of action in 1953.11 In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps 
                                                                                                     
Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1590 (1979) (“The 
First Amendment inevitably defines the operation and extent of the right of 
publicity . . . .”). 
 5. Kwall, supra note 4, at 48; see also Gloria Franke, Note, The Right of 
Publicity vs. the First Amendment: Will One Test Ever Capture the Starring 
Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 965 (2006) (arguing that there is a “lack of a 
principled and consistent method of resolving the conflict between the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. 
L. REV. 903, 916–92 (2003); see also Jordan M. Blanke, No Doubt About It—
You’ve Got to Have Hart: Simulation Video Games May Redefine the Balance 
Between and Among the Right of Publicity, the First Amendment, and Copyright 
Law, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 63 (2013) (explaining that “[e]ven when 
courts apply the same test to the same facts, results are inconsistent”). 
 7. R. Garrett Rice, Note, “Groove is in the Hart”: A Workable Solution for 
Applying the Right of Publicity to Video Games, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 317 
(2015). 
 8. Id. Part V. 
 9. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“The right of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin . . . .”). 
 10. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:2 (2d 
ed. 2014). 
 11. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 
(2d Cir. 1953) (determining that professional baseball players had “the right to 
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing [their] picture[s]”).  
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Chewing Gum, Inc., the parties were rival chewing gum sellers 
who sought to obtain rights from professional baseball players to 
use their pictures on baseball cards.12 The plaintiff, Haelan, 
negotiated exclusive licenses with a number of baseball players, 
but the defendant, Topps, included pictures of some of the same 
players in its own baseball cards.13 The Second Circuit held that 
New York’s privacy law did not cover such uses.14 However, the 
court recognized “that, in additional to and independent of that 
right of privacy . . . , a man has a right in the publicity value of 
his photograph the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture,” 
which it termed “a right of publicity.”15 Today, a majority of states 
recognize the right of publicity as a separate cause of action, 
either under common law or by statute.16 
The essence of a property right is the ability to exclude 
others.17 However, the property right embodied in the right of 
publicity is circumscribed by the First Amendment, which 
protects “the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public 
interest and concern.”18 First Amendment protection is 
particularly robust for expression about celebrities and other 
public figures.19 And “[b]ecause celebrities take on public 
meaning, the appropriation of their likenesses may have 
                                                                                                     
 12. Id. at 867. 
 13. Id. at 868. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 6:3; Rice, supra note 7, at 330–32. 
 17. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing 
the “right to exclude others” as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property”); see also Thomas W. 
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) 
(arguing that “the right to exclude others is more than just one of the most 
essential constituents of property—it is the sine qua non”); Adam Mossoff, What 
Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 389 (2003) 
(“[T]he right to exclude is a necessary characteristic of the concept of property.”). 
 18. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). 
 19. See id. at 51 (“The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the 
First Amendment is bound to produce speck that is critical of . . . public figures 
who are intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, 
by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Baumgartner v. United States, 322 
U.S. 665, 673–74 (1944) (“One of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the 
right to criticize public men and measures . . . .”). 
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important uses in uninhibited debate on public issues, 
particularly debates about culture and value.”20 Thus, an 
unfettered property interest in a person’s name, image, and 
likeness would limit and impoverish the scope of expression about 
public figures. At its extreme, as Professor Michael Madow has 
explained, the right of publicity could facilitate private censorship 
of popular culture.21 
Mr. Rice’s Note addresses a contemporary variation of the 
issue encountered in Haelan Laboratories—whether the depiction 
of highly skilled athletes without their permission violates the 
right of publicity. Of course, the relevant medium is different; at 
issue here is a digital, interactive version of the athletes’ likeness 
in a video game rather than an “analog” still photograph on a 
baseball card. But the bottom line question—what limits does the 
First Amendment impose on the rights of individuals to control 
their image and likeness in a commercial context—remains the 
same. And the potential impact of this issue is economically 
significant; the U.S. video game market is estimated to be over 
$20 billion annually,22 greater than the domestic box office23 and 
the music industry combined.24 
In the more than sixty years since the Second Circuit first 
recognized a right to publicity, courts have yet to definitively 
determine the proper standard to balance the scope of this right 
                                                                                                     
 20. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 
2001). 
 21. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture 
and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 138 (1993); see also Comedy III 
Prods., 21 P.3d at 803 (“[T]he very importance of celebrities in society means 
that the right of publicity has the potential of censoring significant expression 
by suppressing alternative versions of celebrity images that are iconoclastic, 
irreverent, or otherwise attempt to redefine the celebrity’s meaning.”). 
 22. See ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASS’N, supra note 1, at 13. 
 23. See Yearly Box Office, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://boxoffice 
mojo.com/yearly (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (showing total domestic gross movie 
tickets sales of $10.4 billion for 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 24. See Randy Lewis, Music Industry Revenue in 2013 Stayed Flat at $7 
Billion, RIAA Says, L.A. TIMES, (Mar. 18, 2014, 12:32 PM), http:// 
www.latimes.com/entertainment/music/posts/la-et-ms-music-industry-revenue-
riaa-report-streaming-digital-20140318-story.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) 
(stating that overall revenue in the U.S. for the music industry was $7 billion in 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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against the guarantees enshrined in the First Amendment. This 
is not entirely surprising. As the California Supreme Court has 
recognized, “it is not a simple matter to develop a test that will 
unerringly distinguish between forms of artistic expression 
protected by the First Amendment and those that must give way 
to the right of publicity.”25 
In his Note, Mr. Rice identifies and explains the three most 
prominent tests articulated to date—the Rogers test,26 the 
transformative use test,27 and the predominant use test28—and 
finds all of them wanting.29 As a new alternative,30 he proposes a 
“readily identifiable” standard for resolving the conflict between 
the right to publicity and the First Amendment in the realm of 
video games, which is described as follows: “A video game violates 
an individual right of publicity if a person familiar with the 
individual would look at a video game character and know 
immediately that the character is definitively based on the real 
individual.”31 Conversely, if the individual depicted is not 
immediately and definitely identifiable, then the representation 
is deserving of First Amendment protection.32   
Mr. Rice’s proposed “readily identifiable” standard has 
several apparent benefits. First, the standard appears 
                                                                                                     
 25. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 807. 
 26. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003–04 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The 
common law right of publicity . . . grants celebrities an exclusive right to control 
the commercial value of their names and to prevent others from exploiting them 
without permission.”).  
 27. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 
(Cal. 2001) (holding than an “inquiry into whether a work is ‘transformative’ 
appears to us to be necessarily at the heart of any judicial attempt to square the 
right of publicity with the First Amendment). 
 28. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) 
(holding that a “predominant use test” should be employed to determine 
whether the exploitation of a person’s identity violates that person’s right of 
publicity). 
 29. Rice, supra note 7, at 333–34, 337–39, 340–42.  
 30. According to Mr. Rice, this test is based in part on Judge Alarcon’s 
dissent in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1404 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (contending that “[i]t is patently clear to anyone viewing the 
commercial advertisement that [plaintiff] was not being depicted”). Rice, supra 
note 7, at 367. 
 31. Rice, supra note 7, at 366. 
 32. Id. 
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straightforward and easy to administer. By articulating a clear 
rule as to when the right of publicity is implicated, the parties 
know what conduct transgresses the rule and can order their 
affairs, including the licensing of that right, accordingly.33 
Second, the standard avoids an overbreadth problem by 
narrowly construing the scope of the right to publicity, requiring 
that the digital representation is both “immediately” recognizable 
and “definitively based on the real individual.”34 This would avoid 
liability for highly transformative representations, such as the 
depiction of a robot with blond hair acting as a game show 
hostess, which the Ninth Circuit found implicated plaintiff Vanna 
White’s right of publicity.35 
Third, the standard takes a holistic view of the allegedly 
improper representation, considering not only the digital likeness 
of the person allegedly depicted but also the setting and other 
relevant information (including sounds, biographical information, 
and other unique characteristics).36 This will help avoid 
situations where video game manufacturers strongly suggest an 
individual by using personally identifiable information (such as a 
collegiate player’s school, year(s) of enrollment, and jersey 
number), but evade liability by making minor changes to the 
digital representation of the individual’s image and likeness. 
I also have several areas of potential concern regarding Mr. 
Rice’s proposed standard. First, the “readily identifiable” 
                                                                                                     
 33. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 730 (2002) (“[All property right] boundaries should be clear.”); Stewart E. 
Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2008) (“Clarity can be a considerable virtue in 
property rights.”); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 711, 742 (1996) (“The right to property is the right to determine 
the use or disposition of an alienable thing . . . and includes the right 
to . . . license it to others (either exclusively or not) . . . .”). 
 34. Rice, supra note 7, at 366. 
 35. See White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (reversing the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in defendants’ favor on Ms. White’s right of publicity claim 
regarding the depiction of a “female-shaped robot . . . wearing a long gown, 
blond wig, and large jewelry” that “is in the process of turning a block letter on a 
game-board” in defendants’ advertisement); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. 
Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (contending that the panel majority’s decision that 
Ms. White’s right of publicity was implicated by defendants’ advertisement was 
“a classic case of overprotection”). 
 36. Rice, supra note 7, at 368–70. 
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standard is platform dependent; as the Note explains, the test 
“appl[ies] specifically to the video game context.”37 But platform-
neutral tests have been effectively used to balance property and 
First Amendment rights in other areas of the law, most notably 
copyright. In copyright, the fair use defense “balances expressive 
freedoms by permitting one to use another’s copyright expression 
under certain circumstances.”38 The fair use inquiry, which turns 
on four broad, nonexclusive factors,39 has been applied to permit 
expressive speech across variety of platforms, including recording 
and subsequent playback (time shifting) of television programs;40 
reverse engineering and copying of software to achieve 
interoperability on multiple consoles;41 altering the visual display 
and game play of video games;42 and copying, searching, and 
display of images by Internet search engines.43 Although 
sometimes criticized for its unpredictability,44 the fair use defense 
has proven a crucial bulwark against overbroad assertions of 
copyright rights that impinge on First Amendment interests. One 
potential downside of a context-specific test like the “readily 
identifiable” standard is that it could not rely on analogous 
rulings involving other media platforms. 
                                                                                                     
 37. Id. Part V.A. 
 38. Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007). 
 39. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing as relevant factors “(1) the purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes;” “(2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work;” “(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole;” and “(4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work”). 
 40. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 41. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 42. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 43. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 44. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 
(2004) (characterizing fair use as “the right to hire a lawyer”); David Nimmer, 
“Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 263, 280 (2003) (noting the “malleability” of fair use factors). But see 
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541 
(2009) (arguing that “fair use law is both more coherent and more predictable 
than many commentators have perceived”). 
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A second issue is the relevant audience for application of the 
“readily identifiable” standard. As Professors Mark Lemley and 
Jeanne Fromer have recently explained, the relevant audience “is 
critical to understanding how [intellectual property] regimes 
define infringement.”45 Under the “readily identifiable” standard, 
identification is gauged from the perspective of “a person familiar 
with the individual.”46 But such an audience might result in 
overbroad protection because it depends on someone who already 
knows the plaintiff and thus who would be more capable of 
“immediately” and “definitively” identifying him or her. For 
instance, the only people likely to be familiar with the backup 
punter for a team depicted in the NCAA® Football game are the 
punter’s family, friends, and teammates—a very limited 
“audience” for purposes of measuring the right to publicity. Other 
areas of intellectual property law, such as copyright and 
trademark, assess the question of infringement from the 
viewpoint of an ordinary person who consumes the product in 
question.47 This difference may be outcome determinative; the 
average 19-year-old playing NCAA® Football may recognize Sam 
Keller or Ryan Hart, the former quarterbacks for Arizona State 
and Rutgers, respectively, and plaintiffs in right-to-publicity 
litigation, but he or she almost certainly will not be familiar with 
the backup punter (if one exists) for these schools.48 
                                                                                                     
 45. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual 
Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2014). 
 46. Rice, supra note 7, at 366. 
 47. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (explaining 
infringement is judged from “the response of the ordinary lay hearer”); Dawson 
v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining that in 
determining infringement, “a district court must consider the nature of the 
intended audience of the plaintiff’s work. If, as will most often be the case, the 
lay public fairly represents the intended audience, the court should apply 
the . . . ordinary observer test”); Fromer & Lemley, supra note 45, at 1258–59 (in 
trademark law, “the law focuses on consumers . . . as its audience for 
infringement”). 
 48. In contrast, one advantage of using the perspective of audience familiar 
with the person in question is that it may afford protection for “niche” celebrities 
with a geographically or topically limited audience—e.g., an anchor on local 
evening TV news show, or a prominent Jai Alai player—whereas an ordinary 
consumer standard would not. See Rice, supra note 7, at 366–67 (discussing the 
benefits of a “readily identifiable” standard). 
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The final, and perhaps most significant, issue with the 
“readily identifiable” standard is that the mere accurate depiction 
of an individual’s image or likeness in a video game would 
automatically create liability, even if the depiction is used in an 
expressive, transformative, or noncommercial contest. For 
instance, a parody of a person in a video game would appear to 
violate the “readily identifiable” standard if the parody’s target 
was readily identifiable. As the Supreme Court has explained, a 
“parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of th[e] 
original [target] to make the object of its critical wit 
recognizable.”49 Indeed, if the target of a parody was not 
identifiable, then the parody would be ineffective.50 But a rule 
that creates liability for parodies in most cases would raise 
serious constitutional concerns, as parody is generally protected 
by the First Amendment.51 To avoid this problem, I suggest that 
the “readily identifiable” test is better conceived of as the first 
part of a two-part test. If the plaintiff in a right of publicity claim 
is readily identifiable, then courts should ask whether the 
defendant has used the plaintiff’s image or likeness in a way that 
is primary expressive, transformative, or noncommercial. If so, 
then no liability should attach.  
In sum, despite these critiques, Mr. Rice’s Note is an 
excellent piece of student scholarship—it is clearly written, well 
organized, and makes a valuable contribution to the resolution of 
a difficult problem that has perplexed courts and scholars alike 
for decades. If legal scholarship is evaluated based on whether 
“readers can find something professionally valuable in it,” as one 
of my distinguished colleagues has suggested,52 then Mr. Rice has 
certainly risen to the challenge with his Note. 
                                                                                                     
 49. Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994). 
 50. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 
252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A parody must convey two simultaneous—and 
contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the 
original and instead is a parody.” (citation omitted)). 
 51. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 
1994) (“Parody does implicate the First Amendment’s protection of artistic 
expression.”). 
 52. Sarah K. Wiant, Comment: 3D Printing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699, 
705 (2014). 
